A. Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness; Mastery and Servitude

Self-consciousness is in and for itself while and as a result of its being in and for itself for an other; i.e., it is only as a recognized being.⁶ The concept of its unity in its doubling, of infinity realizing itself in self-consciousness, is that of a multi-sided and multi-meaning intertwining, such that, on the one hand, the moments within this intertwining must be strictly kept apart from each other, and on the other hand, they must also be taken and cognized at the same time as not distinguished, or they must be always taken and cognized in their opposed meanings. This twofold sense of what is distinguished lies in the essence of self-consciousness, which is to be infinitely or immediately the opposite of the determinateness in which it is posited. The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity in its doubling presents us with the movement of recognizing.

For self-consciousness, there is another self-consciousness; self-consciousness is outside of itself.⁷ This has a twofold meaning. First, it has lost itself, for it is to be found as an other essence. Second, it has thereby sublated that other, for it also does not see the other as the essence but rather sees itself in the other.

It must sublate its otherness. This is the sublation of that first two-sided ambiguity and is for that reason itself a second two-sided ambiguity. First, it must set out to sublate the other self-sufficient essence in order as a result to become certain of itself as the essence through having sublated the other. Second, it thereby sets out to sublate itself, for this other is itself.

This double-edged sense of the sublating of its double-edged sense of otherness is likewise a double-edged sense of a return into itself. This is so in the first place because it gets itself back through sublation, for it comes to be in equality with itself again through the sublation of its otherness. However, in the second place, it likewise gives the other self-consciousness back to itself, since it existed for itself in the other, but it sublates its being in the other, and it thus sets the other free again.

In this way, this movement of self-consciousness in its relation to another self-consciousness has been represented as the doing of one self-consciousness, but this doing on the part of one self-consciousness has itself the twofold significance of being its own doing just as well as it is the other's doing, for the other is just as self-sufficient. The other is just as enclosed within himself, and there is nothing within him which is not there through himself. The first does not have the object before it in the way that the object only is initially for desire. Instead, it has an object existing for itself self-sufficiently. For that reason, it can do nothing on its own about that object if that object does not do in itself what the first self-consciousness does in it. The movement is thus straightforwardly the doubled movement of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as he does; each himself does what he demands of the other and for that reason also does what he does only insofar as the other does the same. A one-sided doing would be useless because what is supposed to happen can only be brought about through both of them bringing it about.

183. The doing thus carries not only a double-edged sense inasmuch as it is a doing directed as much towards itself as it is directed towards the other, but also inasmuch as it is just as much inseparably the doing of one as well as the doing of the other.

In this movement we see the process repeat itself which had been exhibited as the play of forces in consciousness. What existed for us in that process is here for the extremes themselves. The mediating middle is self-consciousness, which disintegrates into the extremes, and each extreme term is this exchange of its own determinateness and the absolute transition into what is its opposite. However, as consciousness, it does indeed get outside of itself,⁸ but in its being-outside-of-itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself. It is for itself, and its self-externality is for it. It is for consciousness that it immediately is and is not an other consciousness. Likewise, this other is only for itself as it sublates itself as existing-for-itself, and it is for itself only in the being-for-itself of the other. Each is the mediating middle to the other, through which each mediates itself with itself and integrates itself with itself. Each is, to itself, and in that of the other, an essence immediately existing for itself which at the same time is for itself in that way only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other.

This pure concept of recognition, the pure concept of the doubling of self-consciousness in its unity, is itself now up for examination according to how its process appears for self-consciousness. It will first of all exhibit the aspect of inequality between both of them, or the mediating middle breaking apart into the extremes, which are, as extremes, opposed to each other, and of which one is only recognized while the other only recognizes.

Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-itself, and it is self-equal through the exclusion from itself of all that is other, to itself, its essence and absolute object is the I, and within this immediacy, or within this being of its being-for-itself, it is a singular being.⁹ What is other for it, is, as an inessential object, designated by the character of the negative. However, the other is also a self-consciousness, and thus what comes on the scene here is an individual¹⁰ confronting an individual. In the way that they immediately make their appearance, they are for each other in the way ordinary objects do. They are self-sufficient shapes absorbed within the being of life – for the existing object has here been determined to be life – which for each other have not yet achieved the movement of absolute abstraction, they have not yet achieved the destruction of all immediate being and of being themselves only the purely negative being of self-equal consciousness, or they have not yet presented themselves to each other as pure being-for-itself, which is to say, as self-consciousness. Each is, to be sure, certain of itself but not of the other, and for that reason its own certainty of itself is still without truth, for its truth would be only if its own being-for-itself were, to itself, to have exhibited itself as a self-sufficient object, or, what is the same thing, that the object would have turned out to be this pure certainty of itself. However, according to the concept of recognition, this is not possible without the other being for it in the way it is for the other, without each in itself achieving this pure abstraction of being-for-itself, without each achieving this through its own activity and again through the activity of the other.

However, the exhibition of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that it is not at all bound to the universal singularity of existence, that it is not shackled to life. This display is the doubled act, namely, both what the other does and what is done through oneself. To the extent that it is what is done by the other, each thus aims at the death of the other. However, the second aspect is also therein present, namely, what is done through oneself, for the former involves putting one's own life on the line. The relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life and death struggle that each proves its worth to itself, and that both prove their worth to each other.¹¹ – They must engage in this struggle, for each must elevate its self-certainty of existing for itself to truth, both in the other and in itself. And it is solely by staking one's life that freedom is proven to be the essence, namely, that as a result the essence for self-consciousness is proven to be not being, not the immediate way self-consciousness emerges, not its being absorbed within the expanse of life – but rather, it is that there is nothing present in it itself which could not be a vanishing moment for it, that self-consciousness is only pure being-for-itself. The individual who has not risked his life may admittedly be recognized as a person,¹² but he has not achieved the truth of being recognized as a self-sufficient self-consciousness. As each risks his own life, each must likewise aim at the death of the other, for that other no longer counts to him as himself. To himself, his essence exhibits itself as that of an other; he is external to himself,¹³ and he must sublate that being-external-to-himself. The other is a diversely entangled and existing consciousness; he must intuit his otherness as pure being-for-itself, or as absolute negation.

However, this trial by death likewise sublates the truth which was supposed to emerge from it, and, by doing so, completely sublates the certainty of itself. For just as life is the natural location of consciousness, self-sufficiency without absolute negativity, death is the natural negation of this same consciousness, negation without self-sufficiency, which thus endures without the significance of the recognition which was demanded. Through death, the certainty has been established that each has risked his life, and that each has cast a disdainful eye towards death both in himself and in the other. But this is not the case for those who passed the test in this struggle. They sublate their consciousness, which was posited in this alien essentiality which is natural existence, or they elevate themselves and, as extremes wanting to be for themselves, are themselves sublated. The essential moment thereby vanishes from the fluctuating interplay, namely, that of disintegrating into extremes of opposed determinatenesses, and the mediating middle collapses into a dead unity, which breaks down into dead extremes which are merely existents and not opposed. Neither gives back the other to itself nor does it receive itself from the other through consciousness. Rather, they only indifferently leave each other free-standing, like things. Their deed is abstract negation, not the negation of consciousness, which sublates so that it preserves and maintains what has been sublated and which thereby survives its having become sublated.

In this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as is pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness, the simple I is the absolute object. However, for us, or in itself, this object is absolute mediation and has stably existing self-sufficiency as its essential moment. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience. It is through that experience that a pure self-consciousness is posited, and a consciousness is posited which is not purely for itself but for an other, which is to say, is posited as an existing consciousness, or consciousness in the shape of thinghood. Both moments are essential – because they are initially not the same and are opposed, and because their reflection into unity has not yet resulted, they are as two opposed shapes of consciousness. One is self-sufficient; for it, its essence is being-for-itself. The other is non-self-sufficient; for it, life, or being for an other, is the essence. The former is the master, the latter is the servant.

The master is consciousness existing for itself. However, the master is no longer consciousness existing for itself only as the concept of such a consciousness. Rather, it is consciousness existing for itself which is mediated with itself through an other consciousness, namely, through an other whose essence includes its being synthetically combined with self-sufficient being, or with thinghood itself. The master relates himself to both of these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is essential; while (a) the master is, as the concept of self-consciousness, the immediate relation of being-for-itself, but (b) henceforth is at the same time as mediation, or as a being-for-itself that is for itself only through an other, the master in that way relates himself (a) immediately to both, and (b) mediately to each through the other. The master relates himself to the servant mediately through self-sufficient being, for it is on this very point that the servant is held fast. It is his chain, the one he could not ignore in the struggle, and for that reason he proved himself to be non-self-sufficient and to have his self-sufficiency in the shape of thinghood. However, the master is the power over this being, for he has proved in the struggle that to him it only counted as a negative. While he is the power over this being, this being, however, is the power over the other, so that the master thus has within this syllogism the other as subordinate to him. The master likewise relates himself to the thing mediately through the servant. The servant, as self-consciousness itself, relates himself negatively to the thing and sublates the thing. However, at the same time the thing is for him self-sufficient, and, for that reason, he cannot through his negating be over and done with it, cannot have eliminated it; or, the servant only processes it. On the other hand, to the master, the immediate relation comes to be through this mediation as the pure negation of the thing, or as the consumption of the thing. Where desire had failed, the master now succeeds in being over and done with the thing, and he achieves satisfaction in his consumption of it. On account of the thing's self-sufficiency, desire did not achieve this much, but the master, who has interposed the servant between the thing and himself, as a result only links up with the non-self-sufficiency of the thing and simply consumes it. He leaves the aspect of its self-sufficiency in the care of the servant, who works on the thing.

For the master, it is in these two moments that his recognition comes about through another consciousness, since the latter consciousness posits itself as inessential within those moments, first of all by working on the thing, and second of all by his dependence on a determinate existence. In both moments, he cannot achieve mastery over existence and achieve absolute negation. This moment of recognition is present here such that the other consciousness sublates itself as being-for-itself, and it thereby itself does what the first does to it. This is just as much the case for the other moment. What the second self-consciousness does is the first's own doing, for what the servant does is really the master's doing. The latter is only being-for-itself, the essence; he is the pure negative power for which the thing is nothing, and he is thus the pure essential doing in this relationship. However, the servant is not a pure but rather an inessential doing. However, what prevents this from being genuine recognition is the moment where what the master does with regard to the other, he also does with regard to himself, and where what the servant does with regard to himself, he also is supposed to do with regard to the other. As a result, a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and unequal.

The inessential consciousness is therein for the master the object which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself. However, it is clear that this object does not correspond to its concept, but rather that the object in which the master has achieved his mastery has become, to the master, something entirely different from a self-sufficient consciousness. It is not a self-sufficient consciousness which is for him but above all a non-self-sufficient consciousness. His certainty is therefore not that of being-for-itself as the truth; instead, his truth is the inessential consciousness and the inessential doing of that inessential consciousness.

The truth of the self-sufficient consciousness is thus the servile consciousness. To be sure, this consciousness admittedly first appears external to itself¹⁴ and not as the truth of self-consciousness. However, in the way that mastery showed that its essence is the inversion of what mastery wants to be, so too in its consummation will servitude become instead the opposite of what it immediately is. As a consciousness forced back into itself, it will take the inward turn¹⁵ and convert itself into true self-sufficiency.

We only saw what servitude is in relation to mastery. However, servitude is self-consciousness, and thus what it is in and for itself is now up for examination. For servitude, the master is initially the essence. Therefore, to servitude, the truth is the self-sufficient consciousness existing for itself, a truth which for servitude is nonetheless not yet in servitude. Yet servitude has this truth of pure negativity and of being-for-itself in fact in servitude in its own self, for servitude has experienced this essence in servitude. This consciousness was not driven with anxiety about just this or that matter, nor did it have anxiety about just this or that moment; rather, it had anxiety about its entire essence. It felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that feeling, it had inwardly fallen into dissolution, trembled in its depths, and all that was fixed within it had been shaken loose. However, this pure universal movement, this way in which all stable existence becomes absolutely fluid, is the simple essence of self-consciousness; it is absolute negativity, pure being-for-itself, which thereby is in this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-itself is also for this consciousness, for, to itself, its object lies within the master. Furthermore, not only is there this universal dissolution as such, but, in his service, the servant also achieves this dissolution in actuality. In his service, he sublates all of the singular moments of his attachment to natural existence, and he works off his natural existence.

However, the feeling of absolute power as such, and in the particularities of service, is only dissolution in itself, and, although the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom, in that fear consciousness is what it is that is for it itself, but it is not being-for-itself.¹⁶ However, through work, this servile consciousness comes round to itself. In the moment corresponding to desire in the master's consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, as the thing there retained its self-sufficiency. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object, and, as a result, it has reserved to itself that unmixed feeling for its own self.¹⁷ However, for that reason, this satisfaction is itself only a vanishing, for it lacks the objective aspect, or stable existence. In contrast, work is desire held in check, it is vanishing staved off, or: work cultivates and educates.¹⁸ The negative relation to the object becomes the form of the object; it becomes something that endures because it is just for the laborer himself that the object has self-sufficiency. This negative mediating middle, this formative doing, is at the same time singularity, or the pure being-for-itself of consciousness, which in the work external to it now enters into the element of lasting. Thus, by those means, the working consciousness comes to an intuition of self-sufficient being as its own self.

However, what the formative activity means is not only that the serving consciousness as pure being-for-itself becomes, to itself, an existing being within that formative activity. It also has the negative meaning of the first moment, that of fear. For in forming the thing, his own negativity, or his being-for-itself, only as a result becomes an object to himself in that he sublates the opposed existing form. However, this objective negative is precisely the alien essence before which he trembled, but now he destroys this alien negative and posits himself as such a negative within the element of continuance. He thereby becomes for himself an existing-being-for-itself. Being-for-itself in the master is to the servant an other, or it is only for him. In fear, being-for-itself is in its own self. In culturally formative activity,¹⁹ being-for-itself becomes for him his own being-for-itself, and he attains the consciousness that he himself is in and for himself. As a result, the form, by being posited as external, becomes to him not something other than himself, for his pure being-for-itself is that very form, which to him therein becomes the truth. Therefore, through this retrieval, he comes to acquire through himself a mind of his own, and he does this precisely in the work in which there had seemed to be only some outsider's mind. – For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service, as well as the moments of culturally formative activity are both necessary, and both are necessary in a universal way. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear is mired in formality and does not diffuse itself over the conscious actuality of existence. Without culturally formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness will not become for it [consciousness] itself.²⁰ If consciousness engages in formative activity without that first, absolute fear, then it has a mind of its own which is only vanity, for its form, or its negativity, is not negativity in itself, and his formative activity thus cannot to himself give him the consciousness of himself as consciousness of the essence. If he has not been tried and tested by absolute fear but only by a few anxieties, then the negative essence will have remained an externality to himself, and his substance will not have been infected all the way through by it. While not each and every one of the ways in which his natural consciousness was brought to fulfillment was shaken to the core, he is still attached in himself to determinate being. His having a mind of his own is then only stubbornness, a freedom that remains bogged down within the bounds of servility. To the servile consciousness, pure form can as little become the essence as can the pure form – when it is taken as extending itself beyond the singular individual – be a universal culturally formative activity, an absolute concept. Rather, the form is a skill which, while it has dominance over some things, has dominance over neither the universal power nor the entire objective essence.

B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness

On the one hand, to the self-sufficient self-consciousness, its essence is only the pure abstraction of the I. However, on the other hand, while this abstract I develops itself and gives itself differences, this differentiating does not become, to itself, an objective essence existing-in-itself. This self-consciousness thus does not become an I that is genuinely self-distinguished in its simplicity, or a self-consistent I²¹ within this absolute difference. In contrast, pressed back into itself and as the form of the culturally shaped thing, consciousness becomes in formative activity an object to itself, and, in the master, it intuits being-for-itself at the same time as consciousness. However, to the servile consciousness as such a servile consciousness, both of these moments come undone from each other – the moments of itself as the self-sufficient object, and this object as a consciousness and thereby its own essence. – However, while for us, or in itself, the form and the being-for-itself are the same, and while in the concept of self-sufficient consciousness, being-in-itself is consciousness, the aspect of being-in-itself, or thinghood, which received its form through labor, is no other substance but consciousness itself, and, for us, a new shape of self-consciousness has come to be, a consciousness that, to itself, is essence as infinity, or the pure movement of consciousness which thinks, or free self-consciousness. To think does not mean to think as an abstract I, but as an I which, at the same time, signifies being-in-itself, or it has the meaning of being an object to itself, or of conducting itself vis-à-vis the objective essence in such a way that its meaning is that of the being-for-itself of that consciousness for which it is. – To thinking, the object does not move itself according to representations or shapes but rather in concepts, which is to say, the object moves itself within a differentiated being-in-itself, which for consciousness is not anything immediately differentiated from it. What is represented, already shaped, what is an existent, has as such the form of being something other than consciousness. However, a concept is at the same time an existent – and this difference, insofar as it is in its own self, is consciousness' determinate content. – However, in that this content is at the same time a conceptually grasped²² content, consciousness remains immediately self-aware of its unity with this determinate and distinguished existent, not as it would be in the case of representation, in which consciousness especially has to remind itself that this is its representation; rather, the concept is to me immediately my concept. Within thinking, I am free because I am not in an other, but rather I remain utterly at one with myself, and the object, which to me is the essence, is in undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my moving about in concepts is a movement within myself. – However, in this determination of the shape of self-consciousness, it is essential to hold fast to this: That this determination is thinking consciousness itself, or its object is the immediate unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Consciousness, which to itself is that of a “like pole”²³ and which repels itself from itself, becomes, to itself, an element existing-in-itself. However, initially it is, to itself, this element only as the universal essence as such and not as this objective essence in the development and movement of its manifold being.

As it consciously appeared in the history of spirit, this freedom of self-consciousness has, as is well known, been called stoicism. Its principle is this: Consciousness is the thinking essence and something only has essentiality for consciousness, or is true and good for it, insofar as consciousness conducts itself therein as a thinking being.²⁴

The multiple self-differentiating spreading out, isolation, and complexity of life is the object with respect to which desire and labor are active. This multifarious doing has now been concentrated into the simple difference that is in the pure movement of thinking. There is no more essentiality to be found in the difference which has been posited as a determinate thing, or as consciousness of a determinate natural existence, or as a feeling, or as desire and its purpose, whether that purpose is posited by its own consciousness or by that of an alien consciousness. Rather, what has more essentiality is solely the difference that has been thought, or the difference which is not immediately differentiated from me. This consciousness is thereby negative with regard to the relationship of mastery and servitude. Its doing consists in neither being the master who has his truth in the servant nor in being the servant who has his truth in the will of the master and in serving him. Rather, it consists in being free within all the dependencies of his singular existence, whether on the throne or in fetters, and in maintaining the lifelessness which consistently withdraws from the movement of existence, withdraws from actual doing as well as from suffering, and withdraws into the simple essentiality of thought. Stubbornness is the freedom that hitches itself to a singular individuality standing within the bounds of servitude. However, stoicism is the freedom which always immediately leaves servitude and returns back into the pure universality of thought. As a universal form of the world-spirit, it can only come on the scene during a time of universal fear and servitude but which is also a time of universal cultural formation that has raised culturally formative activity all the way up to the heights of thinking.

Now, to be sure, it is true that for this self-consciousness the essence is neither something other than itself, nor is it the pure abstraction of the I. It is instead the I which has otherness in it, but as a difference which has been conceived²⁵ such that within its otherness, this I has immediately returned into itself, and its essence is at the same time only an abstract essence. The freedom of self-consciousness is indifferent with respect to natural existence and for that reason has likewise let go of natural existence, has let it be free-standing, and the reflection is a doubled reflection. Freedom in thought only has pure thoughts as its truth, a truth without any fulfillment in life, and thus it is also not living freedom itself but only the concept of freedom, and, initially it is, to itself, only thinking itself which is its essence. That is, it is the form as such which, in turning away from the self-sufficiency of things, has returned into itself. However, while individuality, as acting, is supposed to show itself to be living, or, as thinking, is supposed to grasp the living world as a system of thoughts, so too within the thoughts themselves there must be for the former expansion a content for what is good, and, for the latter expansion, a content for what is true. There would thereby be for all intents and purposes no other ingredient in what is for consciousness than the concept which is the essence. Yet in the way that the concept as an abstraction has here cut itself off from the manifoldness of things, the concept has in its own self no content; instead, it has a given content. Consciousness indeed abolishes the content as an alien being as it thinks it. However, the concept is a determinate concept, and it is this determinateness of the concept that is the alien which the concept has in it. For that reason, stoicism found itself in an embarrassing situation when it was asked, as the expression had it, for the criterion of truth per se, i.e., when it was in fact asked for a content of thought itself. To the question put to it, “What is good and true?”, its answer was once more that it was the abstract thinking devoid of all content itself, namely, that the true and the good is supposed to consist in rationality. However, this self-equality of thinking is only again the pure form in which nothing is determinate. The general terms, “true” and “good,” or “wisdom” and “virtue,” with which stoicism is stuck, are on the whole undeniably uplifting, but because they cannot in fact end up in any kind of expansion of content, they quickly start to become tiresome.

201. In the way it has determined itself as abstract freedom, this thinking consciousness is therefore only the incomplete negation of otherness. Having only pulled itself back into itself from out of existence, it has not in itself achieved itself as the absolute negation of this existence. To be sure, the content counts to it only as thought, but thereby also as determinate thought and at the same time determinateness as such determinateness.

Skepticism is the realization of that of which stoicism is only the concept – and it is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is. Skepticism is in itself the negative, and that is the way it must exhibit itself. With the reflection of self-consciousness into the simple thoughts of itself, self-sufficient existence, or the lasting determinateness confronting it, has in fact fallen outside of the infinity of thought. In skepticism, the whole inessentiality and non-self-sufficiency of this other comes to be for consciousness; thought becomes the thinking that annihilates the being of the manifoldly determinate world, and the negativity of free self-consciousness in the heart of these multifarious shapes of life becomes, to itself, real negativity. – It is clear that just as stoicism corresponds to the concept of self-sufficient consciousness (which appeared as a relationship between mastery and servitude), skepticism corresponds to the realization of the concept of self-sufficient consciousness as the negative direction (of desire and work) towards otherness. However much desire and work were not able to achieve the negation for self-consciousness, by contrast this polemical direction towards the manifold self-sufficiency of things meets with success because, within itself, as an already culminated and free self-consciousness, it turns against them. To put it more precisely, because this polemical orientation has thinking in its own self, or infinity, those self-sufficiencies, according to their differences, are therein only as vanishing magnitudes to it. The differences which in the pure thinking of itself are only the abstraction of differences become here all of the differences, and every differentiated being becomes a difference of self-consciousness.

Thereby what skepticism as such does, as well as its way of doing it, determines what skepticism is. It highlights the dialectical movement, which is sensuous-certainty, perception, and the understanding, as well as the inessentiality of what counts as determinate both within the relationship between mastery and servitude and for abstract thinking itself. At the same time, that relationship comprehends within itself a determinate manner in which ethical laws, as commands by the master, are also present. However, the determinations within abstract thinking are concepts of science in which contentless thinking expands itself and attaches the concept in an external manner only onto the being which, to itself, is self-sufficient and which constitutes its content. It holds only such determinate concepts to be valid even though they are also only pure abstractions.

The dialectical, as negative movement in the way that such movement immediately is, initially appears to consciousness as something to which consciousness must give way and which does not exist through consciousness itself. In contrast, as skepticism, it is a moment of self-consciousness, to which it does not simply happen that the true and the real for it vanishes without its knowing how this comes about. Rather, it is what, within the certainty of its freedom, lets this other, which is giving itself the appearance of being real, itself vanish. It not only lets the objective as such vanish but also its own conduct towards the object in which self-consciousness both counts as objective and is affirmatively asserted. It thus also allows its perceiving to vanish in the way that it reinforces what it is in danger of losing, namely, sophistry and the truth which it has itself determined and has itself established. Through that self-conscious negation, self-consciousness itself engenders for itself both the certainty of its own freedom and the experience of that freedom, and as a result it raises them to truth. What vanishes is the determinate, or the difference which, no matter what it is or from where it comes, is established as fixed and unchangeable. The difference has nothing lasting in it, and it must vanish for thinking because what is differentiated is just this: Not to be in its own self but rather to have its essentiality only in an other. However, thinking is the insight into this nature of what is differentiated; it is the negative essence as simple essence.

Throughout the changing flux of everything which would secure itself for it, skeptical self-consciousness thus experiences its own freedom, both as given to itself by itself and as sustained by itself to itself; it is this Ataraxia [indifference] of thought-thinking-itself,²⁶ the unchangeable and genuine certainty of its own self. This certainty does not emerge from an alien source whose multifarious development would have collapsed into itself, nor does it emerge as a result which would have its coming-to-be firmly behind it. Rather, consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this mixture of sensuous representations and representational thought, whose differences collapse into each other and whose equality – for this equality is itself determinateness with respect to the unequal – likewise is again brought to dissolution. However, this consciousness, instead of being a self-equal consciousness, is in fact therein only an utterly contingent disarray, the vertigo of a perpetually self-creating disorder. This is what it is for itself, for it itself sustains and engenders this self-moving disarray. For that reason, it avows that it is an entirely contingent singularly individual consciousness – a consciousness which is empirical, which orients itself according to what has no reality for it, which obeys what is not essential for it, and which acts on and actualizes what has no truth for it. However, just in the way that, to itself, it counts as a singular individual, as contingent, and in fact, as both animal life and as forsaken self-consciousness, it also, on the contrary, makes itself again into universal self-equal self-consciousness, for it is the negativity of all singular individuality and all difference. From this self-equality, or from within itself, it instead falls back once again into that contingency and disarray, for this self-moving negativity has to do solely with what is singularly individual, and it occupies itself with what is contingent. This consciousness is thus the insensible claptrap that goes to and fro from the one extreme of self-equal self-consciousness to the other extreme of contingent, disordered, and disordering consciousness. It does not itself bring either of these two thoughts of itself into contact with each other. At one time, it has cognizance²⁷ of its freedom as an elevation above all the disarray and contingency of existence, and at another time it again just as much avows that it is backsliding into inessentiality and wandering aimlessly within it. It lets the inessential content in its thinking vanish, but it is therein the very consciousness of something inessential. It speaks about absolute disappearance, but that “speaking about” itself is, and this consciousness is the disappearance spoken about. It speaks about the nullity of seeing, hearing, and so on, and it itself sees, hears, and so on. It speaks about the nullity of ethical essentialities, and then it makes those essentialities themselves into the powers governing its actions. Its acts and its words always contradict each other, and it itself has the doubled contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and equality combined with that of utter contingency and inequality with itself. However, it keeps its contradictions separated from each other, and it conducts itself in relation to them in the way it does in its purely negative movement itself. If equality is pointed out to it, it points out inequality, and if it is reproached with the latter (about which it had just spoken), it quickly shifts over into pointing out equality. Its talk is indeed like that of a squabble among stubborn children, one of whom says A when the other says B, and then says B when the other says A. By being in contradiction with himself, each of them purchases the delight of remaining in contradiction with each other.

206. In skepticism, consciousness experiences itself in truth as a self-contradictory consciousness. From out of this experience, there then arises a new shape which brings together the two thoughts which skepticism keeps asunder. Skepticism's thoughtlessness about itself has to vanish because it is in fact one consciousness that has these two modes in it. This new shape is thereby one that is for itself the doubled consciousness of itself as self-liberating, unchangeable, self-equal self-consciousness, and of itself as absolutely self-confusing, self-inverting – and it is the consciousness of its being this contradiction. – In stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself; in skepticism, it realizes itself and annihilates the other aspect of determinate existence, but on the contrary it doubles itself and is, to itself, now something twofold. The doubling, which was previously distributed between two singular individuals, the master and the servant, is thereby brought back into one singular individual. Although the doubling of self-consciousness within itself, which is essential in the concept of spirit, is thereby present, its unity is not yet present, and the unhappy consciousness is the consciousness of itself as a doubled, only contradictory creature.²⁸

Because, to itself, this contradiction of its essence is one consciousness, this unhappy and estranged consciousness within itself also must always have in one consciousness that of an other consciousness. But just when it thinks itself to have achieved victory and to have achieved restful unity with the other consciousness, each must again be immediately expelled from the unity. However, its true return into itself, or its reconciliation with itself, will exhibit the concept of the spirit that has been brought to life and has entered into existence, because in it, as one undivided consciousness, it is already a doubled consciousness. It itself is the beholding of a self-consciousness in an other; it itself is both of them; and, to itself, the unity of both is also the essence. However, for itself it is, to itself, not yet this essence itself, nor is it yet the unity of both.

While at first it is only the immediate unity of both, but while, for it, the two are opposed consciousnesses and not the same consciousness, one of them, namely, the simple unchangeable, is, to itself, as the essence, the other, however, the manifoldly changeable, as the inessential. For it, both are essences that are alien to each other. Because it is the consciousness of this contradiction, it itself takes the side of the changeable consciousness and is, to itself, the inessential. However, as consciousness of unchangeableness, or of the simple essence, it must at the same time concern itself with freeing itself from the inessential, which means to free itself from itself. For whether it is indeed for itself only the changeable and the unchangeable is, to itself, something alien, it is in that way itself simple and thereby unchangeable consciousness. It is thereby aware of the unchangeable consciousness as its essence, although it is still aware of it in such a way that for itself it itself is again not this essence. The stance that it assigns to both thus cannot be an indifference of one to the other, i.e., cannot be an indifference of itself with respect to the unchangeable. Rather, it is immediately itself both of them, and, for it, it is the relation of both as a relation of essence to the inessential, in such a manner that this latter is to be sublated. However, while both are, to itself, equally essential and equally contradictory, it is only the contradictory movement in which the opposite does not come to rest in its own opposite but instead newly engenders itself only as an opposite within it.

As a result, there is a struggle against an enemy in which victory really means defeat and in which attaining one thing means instead losing it in its opposite. Consciousness of life, of its existence, and of its activities only amounts to a sorrow over this existence and these doings, for consciousness has therein only the consciousness both of its opposite as being its essence and of its own nullity. In elevating itself beyond this, consciousness makes a transition into the unchangeable. However, this elevation is itself this same consciousness; it is thus immediately the consciousness of the opposite, namely, of itself as singular individuality. Just as a result of that, the unchangeable which enters into consciousness is at the same time affected by singular individuality, and it is current there only together with singular individuality. Instead of singular individuality having been abolished in the consciousness of the unchangeable, it only continues to emerge within it.

However, in this movement consciousness experiences this very emergence of singular individuality in the unchangeable and the emergence of the unchangeable in singular individuality. For consciousness, that singular individuality itself comes to be in the unchangeable essence, and, at the same time, its own singular individuality comes to be in the unchangeable essence. For the truth of this movement is the very oneness of this doubled consciousness. However, to itself, this unity becomes at first itself the sort of unity in which the difference of both is still dominant. As a result, what is present for consciousness is the threefold way in which singular individuality is bound up with the unchangeable. At one time, it comes forth again, to itself, as opposed to the unchangeable essence, and it is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle, which remains the element of the whole relationship. However, at another time, for consciousness the unchangeable itself has in itself singular individuality such that singular individuality is a shape of the unchangeable into which the entire way of existing moves over. At a third time, consciousness finds itself to be this singular individuality within the unchangeable. To consciousness, the first unchangeable is only the alien essence passing sentence on it. While the other unchangeable is a shape of singular individuality like itself, consciousness becomes, thirdly, spirit. It has the joy of finding itself therein, and it is aware that its singular individuality is reconciled with the universal.

What appears here to be a mode and a relationship obtaining in the unchangeable has turned out to be the learning experience of the estranged self-consciousness in its own unhappiness. To be sure, now this experience is not its one-sided movement, for it is itself unchangeable consciousness. Hence, it is also at the same time singularly individual consciousness; the movement is just as much a movement of the unchangeable consciousness, which makes its appearance in it just as the other makes its appearance in it. This is so because the movement runs through the following moments: First, there is the unchangeable opposed to the singular individual per se, then there is itself as a singular individual opposed to other singular individuals, and, finally, there is its being One with the singular individual. However, this observation, insofar as it is made by us, is ill-timed here, for until now, it has, to us, only been unchangeableness as the unchangeableness of consciousness which has arisen, and which, still burdened with an opposite, is not true unchangeableness. It is thus not the unchangeable in and for itself. Hence, we do not know how this latter will acquit itself. What has resulted here is only that for consciousness, which is our object here, the determinations indicated above appear in the unchangeable.

For this reason, with regard to singularly individual consciousness, the unchangeable consciousness thus itself also retains within its shape the character and the fundamentals of estrangement and of being-for-itself. For the latter, it is simply an event such that the unchangeable receives the shape of singular individuality. This is so because singularly individual consciousness is only to be found as opposed to the unchangeable, and it therefore has this relationship through a fact of nature.²⁹ That it is finally to be found within it appears to it in part as something engendered through itself, or it comes about for the reason that it itself is singularly individual. However, one part of this unity, in accordance with its origin and insofar as it is, appears to it as belonging to the unchangeable, and the opposition remains within this unity itself. It is through the unchangeable taking shape that the moment of the other-worldly beyond has not only lasted but has become even more securely fixed, for if, on the one hand, the other-worldly beyond seems to be brought closer to the singular individual by this shape of singular actuality, then it is, on the other hand, henceforth opposed to it as an opaque sensuous One possessing all the aloofness of something actual. The hope of coming to be at one with it must remain a hope, which is to say, it must remain without fulfillment, without ever being present. Between the hope and the fulfillment stands the absolute contingency or immovable indifference which lies in the shape itself, or in the very basis of the hope. Through the nature of this existing One, or through the actuality it has taken on, it necessarily happens that in time it has disappeared, and, having once existed, it remains spatially utterly distant.

However much at first the mere concept of the estranged consciousness is determined as seeking to sublate itself as a singular consciousness and thereby to become the unchangeable consciousness, still its striving henceforth takes on the following determination. It sublates its relationship to the pure unshaped unchangeable, and it gives itself instead only a relation to the shaped unchangeable. It does this because, to itself, the oneness of the singular individual with the unchangeable is henceforth the essence and object, and it is this in the way that in the concept, the essential object was only the shapeless, abstract unchangeable. It must now turn its back on the relationship in this absolute estrangement of the concept. However, it must elevate the initially external relation to the shaped unchangeable as an alien actuality into an absolute oneness with it.

The movement within which the inessential consciousness strives to achieve this union is itself threefold according to the threefold relationships that this consciousness will have with its shaped other-worldly beyond: once as pure consciousness; second, as a singular essence which, as desire and labor, relates itself to actuality; and third, as consciousness of its being-for-itself. – How these three modes of its being are present and how they are determined within those universal relationships is what is now to be seen.

If therefore at first it is taken to be pure consciousness, then while it is for pure consciousness, the shaped unchangeable seems to be posited as it is in and for itself. Yet the shaped unchangeable as it is in and for itself has, as was already noted, not yet emerged. If the unchangeable were in consciousness as it is in and for itself, then this would surely have to come out instead from the unchangeable than from out of consciousness itself. However, through consciousness, its presence is initially here only one-sidedly present. For that very reason, it is not perfectly and genuinely present but instead remains encumbered with imperfection, or with an opposite.

However, even though the unhappy consciousness does not therefore have this presence in its possession, it is at the same time high above pure thinking insofar as it is stoicism's abstract thinking turning a blind eye to singular individuality altogether and is the only unsettled and agitated thinking of skepticism – which is indeed only singular individuality both as the unconscious contradiction and the unremitting movement of that contradiction. – It transcends both of these; it both brings together and keeps together pure thinking and singular individuality, but it has not yet been elevated to that thinking for which the singular individuality of consciousness is reconciled with pure thinking itself. Put more correctly, it stands instead at the midpoint where abstract thinking comes into contact with the singular individuality of consciousness as singular individuality. It itself is this contact; it is the unity of pure thinking and singular individuality. For it, it is also this thinking singular individuality, or pure thinking; it is essentially the unchangeable itself as singular individuality. However, what is not for it is that its object, the unchangeable, which, to it, essentially has the shape of singular individuality, is it itself, is itself the singularity of consciousness.

In this first way in which we view it as pure consciousness, the unhappy consciousness does not conduct itself towards its object in a thinking manner. Rather, while it is just in itself pure, thinking singular individuality, and while its object is itself just this pure thinking, and while pure thinking is not itself the relation of each to the other, it only, so to speak, launches itself in the direction of thinking, and on that path it becomes devotion.³⁰ As such, its thinking remains that of the shapeless roar of the pealing of bells, or that of a warm, all-suffusing vapor, or that of a musical thinking which does not amount to concepts, which themselves would be the sole, immanent, objective mode of thinking. To be sure, the object for this infinite, pure, inward feeling will eventually come to be, but coming on the scene in that way, this object does not make its entrance as conceptualized, and for that reason it comes on the scene as something alien. What is thereby present is the inward movement of the pure heart which painfully feels itself as estranged. It is the movement of an infinite longing which is certain that its essence is that of a pure heart, that it is a pure thinking that thinks of itself as singular individuality, and that this object takes cognizance of it³¹ and bestows recognition on it for the very reason that this object thinks of itself as singular individuality. However, at the same time this essence is the unattainable other-worldly beyond which, in the act of being seized, escapes, or rather has already escaped. It has already escaped, for it is in part the unchangeable thinking of itself as singular individuality, and consciousness thus immediately attains itself within it, but it does so as what is opposed to the unchangeable. Instead of catching hold of the essence, consciousness only feels it and has thus fallen back into itself. While attaining this, consciousness cannot prevent itself from being this opposed consciousness, it has only caught hold of inessentiality instead of having caught hold of the essence. While in one aspect, in striving to attain itself in the essence, it only catches hold of its own divided actuality, so too in another aspect, it cannot catch hold of that other as a singular individual or as an actual other. Where the other is sought, it cannot be found, for it is just supposed to be an other-worldly beyond, or the kind of thing that cannot be found. Sought as individual, it turns out not to be a universal singular individuality of thought,³² or it turns out not to be a concept but rather to be the singular individual as an object, or as an actuality, an object of immediate sense certainty. Just for that reason, it thus turns out only to be the kind of thing that has vanished. For consciousness, what can thus be for it at the present time can only be the grave of its life. However, because this grave itself is an actuality, and since it is contrary to the nature of this actuality to confer any lasting possession, the present moment of that grave is only the struggle over an endeavor that must end in defeat. However, while consciousness has learned from experience that the grave of its actual unchangeable essence has no actuality, that the vanished singular individuality as vanished is not true individuality, it will give up searching for the unchangeable singular individuality as actual, or it will cease trying to hold on to it as something that has vanished. Only then is it for the first time capable of finding singular individuality as genuine, or as universal.

However, initially the return of the heart into itself is to be taken in the sense that, to itself, it is the heart which has singularly individual actuality. It is the pure heart for us, or in itself, which has found itself and which is satiated within itself, for even though for it, to itself, in its feelings, the essence has in fact cut itself off from it, this feeling is nonetheless in itself self-feeling.³³ It has felt the object of its pure feeling, and this object is itself; it thus emerges as self-feeling, or as the actual existing for itself. In this return into itself, its second relationship has come to be for us, namely, those of desire and labor, which to consciousness has proven itself to be the inner certainty of consciousness itself, a certainty it had achieved for us through the sublation and the consumption of the alien essence, specifically, of that essence in the form of self-sufficient things. However, the unhappy consciousness is to be found only as desiring and laboring consciousness; it is not in a position to find itself so that its inner certainty of itself would be its ground, nor so that its feeling of the essence would be only this feeling of its own self.³⁴ While it does not have that certainty for itself, its innerness still remains instead a shattered self-certainty. Its proving its own worth,³⁵ which it would obtain through work and consumption, is for that reason just the same shattered proof of its worth; or instead it must itself do away with this proof of its worth so that it finds such a proof on its own, but only the proof of the worth of what it is for itself, namely, its estrangement.

The actuality which desire and work turn against is for this consciousness no longer something which is null in itself, something only to be sublated and consumed by that consciousness. Rather, it is something like consciousness itself, an actuality at odds with itself,³⁶ which in one respect is only null in itself but which in another respect is also a sanctified world. This actuality is a shape of the unchangeable, for the latter has preserved singular individuality in itself, and because, as the unchangeable, it is the universal, the meaning of its singular individuality itself is that of all actuality.

However much consciousness were for itself self-sufficient consciousness, and however much actuality were, to itself, in and for itself null, still in work and consumption, consciousness would arrive at the feeling of its own self-sufficiency, and as a result, it would then itself be that which would sublate actuality. However, while this actuality is, to itself, the shape of the unchangeable, consciousness is not on its own capable of sublating that actuality, but rather, while consciousness does indeed arrive at annihilating actuality and consuming it, what essentially happens for it as a result is that the unchangeable itself surrenders its shape and hands it over to consciousness to consume. – For its part, consciousness likewise comes on the scene as what is actual, but, just as much, as internally shattered. This estrangement shows up in its work and its consumption, such that it breaks itself up into a relation to actuality, or it breaks itself up into a being-for-itself and a being-in-itself. That relation to actuality is the alteration, or the doing, the being-for-itself, which belongs to the singularly individual consciousness as such. However, it is therein also in itself, and this aspect belongs to the unchangeable other-worldly beyond. They are the abilities and powers, an alien gift, which the unchangeable likewise hands over to consciousness to make use of.

Accordingly, in its doing, consciousness is initially in relationships between two extremes. On one side, it is positioned as an active this-worldliness, confronted by passive actuality [on the other side]. Both are in relation to each other, but both also have returned into the unchangeable, where each in itself tenaciously clings to itself. Hence, it is in both aspects that it is only the superficialities which detach themselves with respect to each other, and each of them then joins the game which consists in moving around with respect to the other. – The extreme of actuality is sublated by the active extreme. However, on its side, actuality can only be sublated because it is its unchangeable essence itself which sublates it, which repels itself from itself, and which surrenders what it has repelled to the activity. The active force appears as the power in which actuality is dissolved. This consciousness is that to which the in-itself, or the essence, is, to itself, an other, and for this reason, this power, which is how consciousness enters into doing, is for this consciousness the other-worldly beyond of itself. Therefore, instead of making an inward return into itself from out of its doing, and instead of having itself proven its worth for itself, consciousness instead reflects this movement of doing into the other extreme. This other extreme thereby shows up as what is purely universal, as the absolute power which was the starting point for a movement in all directions. It is supposed to be the essence of the self-corroding extremes both in the way that they first made their appearance and in the flux itself.

The unchangeable consciousness relinquishes its shape and surrenders it, and, in exchange, the singular individual consciousness gives thanks, i.e., denies itself the satisfaction of the consciousness of its self-sufficiency and assigns the essence of its doing not to itself but to the other-worldly beyond. From both of these moments of reciprocal self-surrender on both sides, its unity with the unchangeable emerges. However, at the same time, this unity is affected by division, and it is again broken up within itself. It is from out of this unity that the opposition of universal and singular again comes on the scene. To be sure, consciousness makes a show of renouncing the satisfaction of its own self-feeling.³⁷ However, it achieves the actual satisfaction of that self-feeling, for it is desire, work, and consumption; as consciousness, it has willed, acted, and consumed. Its giving thanks, in which it recognizes the other extreme as the essence and thus sublates itself, is likewise its own doing, which offsets the other extreme's doing and counters the self-surrendering favor with an equal act. If the former cedes to consciousness what is superficial, consciousness still gives thanks but only goes that far, and while it itself surrenders its doing, i.e., its essence, it thus really does more therein than the other, which only repels the superficial from itself. The whole movement is therefore reflected not only in actual desire, labor, and consumption, but even in its very giving of thanks, a doing in which the very opposite seems to take place. That is, the whole movement is reflected off into the extreme of singular individuality. Consciousness therein feels itself to be this singular individual consciousness, and it does not let itself be deceived by its own show of renunciation, for the truth in all of this is that it has not given itself up. What has come about is only the doubled reflection into both extremes, and the result is the repeated fissure into the opposed consciousness of the unchangeable and the consciousness of a willing, performing, and consuming consciousness. It is also the repeated fissure in the self-renunciation itself which confronts it, or of singular individuality existing-for-itself as such.

The third relationship in the movement of this consciousness has thereby come on the scene. This third relationship follows from the second and has in truth, through its willing and through its accomplishment, put itself to the test as self-sufficient consciousness. In the first relationship, it was only the concept of actual consciousness, or the inner heart, which was not yet actual in doing and in consumption. The second is this actualization as external doing and as consuming. However, having returned from out of all of this, consciousness is now such that it has experienced itself as actual and as efficacious, or as that for which it is true that it is in and for itself. However, the enemy is found therein in its ownmost shape. In the battle of hearts, the singular individual consciousness is only as a musical, abstract moment. In work and consumption, as the realization of this essenceless being, it can immediately forget itself, and its conscious ownness in this actuality is suppressed through the thankful bestowal of recognition. However, this suppression is in truth a return of consciousness back into itself, namely, into itself, to itself, as the genuine actuality.

This third relationship, in which this genuine actuality is one extreme, is the relation of this actuality as nullity to the universal essence. The movement of this relation is still open to examination.

To begin with, with regard to the opposed relation of consciousness within which its reality is, to itself, immediately a nullity, the actual doing of consciousness becomes a doing of nothing, and its consumption becomes a feeling of its unhappiness. Doing and consumption thereby lose all universal content and meaning, for if they had such content and meaning, they would have existed as being-in-and-for-itself. Instead, both are withdrawn back into singular individuality, and consciousness directs itself towards that singular individuality with a view to sublating both doing and consumption. In its animal functions, consciousness is consciousness of itself as this actual singular individual. These functions, instead of being performed without embarrassment as something which are in and for themselves null and which can acquire no importance and essentiality for spirit, are instead now objects of serious attention and they acquire the utmost importance, since it is in them that the enemy shows itself in its distinctive shape. However, while this enemy engenders itself in its very suppression, consciousness, by fixating itself on the enemy, is instead continually dwelling on it instead of freeing itself from it. It continually sees itself as polluted, and, at the same time, the content of its strivings, instead of being something essential, is the very lowest, and instead of being a universal, is the most singular. What we see here is only a personality limited to itself and its own petty acts; we see a brooding personality, as unhappy as it is impoverished.

However, in both the feeling of its unhappiness and in the poverty of its acts, consciousness just as much binds itself to its unity with the unchangeable. For the attempted immediate annihilation of its actual being is mediated through the thought of the unchangeable, and it takes place within this relation. The mediated relation constitutes the essence of the negative movement in which this consciousness directs itself against its singular individuality, but which as a relation, is likewise positive in itself and will engender its unity for this consciousness itself.

This mediated relation is thereby a syllogism in which singular individuality, which had initially fixed on itself as opposed to the in-itself, is merged with this other extreme only through a third. It is through this mediating middle that the extreme of unchangeable consciousness is for the inessential consciousness. At the same time in the inessential consciousness, there is also the following. The inessential consciousness is just as much supposed to be for the unchangeable consciousness only through the mediating middle, and this mediating middle is thereby what both presents³⁸ the two extremes to each other and is the mutual servant of each for the other. This mediating middle is itself a conscious essence, for it is a doing which mediates consciousness as such. The content of this doing is what consciousness is undertaking, namely, the erasure of its singular individuality.

Within the mediating middle, this consciousness frees itself from doing and consumption as what are its own. As an extreme existing-for-itself, it repels from itself the essence of its will, and it shifts over to the mediating term, or to the servant, the very ownness of its decisions and its freedom and, with that, any blame³⁹ for its own acts. Since this mediator is in an immediate relation to the unchangeable essence, he renders service by offering counsel about what is right. According to those aspects of doing or of willing, the action, as it is obedience to an alien decision, ceases to be its own. However, for the inessential consciousness, what still remains is its objective aspect, namely, the fruit of its labor and its consumption. It likewise repels these from itself, and it renounces its willing as well as the actuality contained in its labor and consumption. In part, it renounces that actuality as the truth it has attained concerning its self-conscious self-sufficiency – while it preoccupies itself with representational thinking and with talking about something that is, to itself, totally alien and senseless. In part, it renounces it as being external property – while it gives up something of the possession it has acquired through its labor. And in part, it renounces its consumption – while in its fastings and its mortifications, it again denies itself that consumption.

Through these moments of first surrendering its own decision, then surrendering its property and consumption, finally, through the positive moment of carrying out a task it does not understand, it deprives itself in truth and completely of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of actuality as its being-for-itself. It has the certainty of having in truth emptied⁴⁰ itself of its I, and of having made its immediate self-consciousness into a thing, into an objective being. – It could prove the worth of its self-renunciation solely by this actual sacrifice, for only in that sacrifice does the deception vanish which lies in the inner recognition of giving thanks through the heart and through one's disposition and one's speech. In that self-renunciation, there is a bestowal of recognition that shifts all the power of being-for-itself away from itself and instead treats this power as a gift from above. However, in this very shifting, it itself retains its external ownness in the possession which it does not give up, and it retains its inner ownness both in the consciousness of the decision that it itself has taken and in the consciousness of the content determined through itself, which it has not exchanged for an alien content that would fill it only with meaninglessness.

But in the actual, completed sacrifice, its unhappiness has in itself been purged from it just in the way that consciousness has sublated its doing as its own. However, that this purging has taken place in itself is itself a doing that has been carried out by the other extreme of the syllogism, which is the essence existing-in-itself. That sacrifice of the inessential extreme, however, was at the same time not a one-sided doing; instead, it contained the other's doing within itself. For on the one hand, surrendering one's own will is only negative according to its concept, or in itself, but at the same time it is positive, specifically, it is the positing of the will as an other, and, especially, it is the positing of the will as universal, not as the will of a singular individual. For this consciousness, the positive significance of the negatively posited singular individual will is the will of the other extreme, which, just because it is an other for consciousness, becomes, to itself, the act of giving counsel. It becomes this not through itself but through the third, the mediator. Hence, for consciousness, its will becomes universal will, a will existing in itself, although, to itself, it itself is not this will in-itself. That it surrenders its own will as a singular individual is, to itself and according to the concept, not what is positive about the universal will. Its surrender of possessions and its abandonment of consumption likewise only have the same negative significance, and the universal which as a result comes to be for it is, to itself, not its own doing. With regard to this unity of objective being and being-for-itself which lies in the concept of doing, and which for that reason, to consciousness, comes to be as the essence and object – just as this unity is, to consciousness, not the concept of its doing, it is also not the case, to consciousness, that the unity comes to be immediately as an object for that consciousness and through itself. Rather, it lets the mediating servant express this yet shattered certainty; that expression turns out to be that it is only in itself that its unhappiness is the inverse, that is to say, only in itself is it a self-satisfying doing or a blessed enjoyment in consuming. Likewise, only in itself is its impoverished doing the inverse, namely, absolute doing, or, to put it according to the concept, a doing is only a doing at all as the doing of a singular individual. However, for the consciousness itself, doing continues, and its actual doing remains impoverished. Its enjoyment in consumption remains sorrowful, and the sublation of these in any positive sense continues to be postponed to an other-worldly beyond. However, within this object, its doing and its being as this singularly individual consciousness is, to itself, being and doing in itself. Thus, within this object, the representational thought of reason has, to itself, come to be. This is the representational thought of the certainty for this consciousness that it is absolutely in itself within its singular individuality, or it is its certainty of being all reality.